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Introduction
The essence of self-control
Self-control is the ability of people to control their 
own behaviour in relative autonomy from external 
pressures, from their innate or learned automatisms, and 
physiological impulses (Baumeister & Tierney, 2011; 
Krug & Carter, 2010; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). It 
manifests itself, for instance, in the ability to refrain from 
unnecessary or harmful responses, in the ability to postpone 
gratification, in skilful regulation of emotions, as well as 
in attentive treatment of other people and behavioural 
adjustment to a social context.
Self-control does not work spontaneously and 
effortlessly. On the contrary, getting out of the automatic 
mode of behaviour requires work, understood literally 
as the consumption of available energy resources (e.g., 
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Gailliot 
et al., 2007). Therefore, exercising self-control is tiresome, 
sometimes leading to total exhaustion of resources and 
unintended falling back into the mode of automatic control 
of behaviour.
The automatic control mode is not in itself 
reprehensible or harmful. We entrust many of our everyday 
activities to our “autopilot”, which uses previously learned 
patterns of behaviour, habits or reflexes. In this way, we 
perform many routine actions, sometimes quite complex, 
but still standard and repetitive. Thanks to this autopilot 
system we can save valuable energy resources of the 
organism and allocate them to non-standard operations, 
requiring an intensive focus of attention and engagement 
of executive functions. We pay for the privilege of 
attentive carrying out of non-conventional actions by a 
sort of “mindlessness” of standard actions. This can lead 
to problems only when, for instance, we try to implement 
conventional solutions in some new or non-typical 
conditions, or when standard conditions change into 
non-standard ones. In such cases it is required to turn on 
the self-control system immediately, and get out of the 
automatic control mode.
The level of self-control is not equal in all people. It 
is also not fixed in an individual, but constantly fluctuates. 
It seems that self-control can be regarded, on the one 
hand, as a permanent trait, and, on the other hand, as a 
temporary state. The distinction between a state and a trait 
is nothing new in psychology. It seems that it corresponds 
very well to reality, e.g., in the case of anxiety (Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Lushen, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) or depression 
(Clark, Vittengl, Kraft, & Jarrett, 2003). Of course, self-
control as a trait is permanent only in a relative sense, 
because it is developing, is being shaped in ontogenesis, 
and – perhaps – can be trained (Muraven, Baumeister, 
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& Tice, 1999). However, such changes occur in the long 
term, as do modifications of other individual characteristics 
(intelligence, personality, temperament). In contrast, 
self-control as a state seems to be subject to short-term 
fluctuations, depending on situational and social context, 
or the psychophysical state of the organism. This paper 
presents a method of measuring self-control as a relatively 
permanent individual trait, varying between individuals.
This trait reveals itself on three levels of organisation 
which require separate research perspectives. The top 
floor of the analysis refers to behavioural control, or 
personal self-control (Chuderski, 2010). At this level, 
self-control is directly observable in behaviour. The self-
control is exercised by the whole agent, and particular 
cognitive and executive functions (Miyake, Friedman, 
Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000) – such as inhibition, 
switching between tasks, and updating the contents of 
working memory – are “at the service” of self-control 
attributed to the whole agent. This lower cognitive 
level of self-control cannot be directly observed. One 
can only develop behavioural indicators of occurrence, 
progression, and effectiveness or ineffectiveness of these 
control functions. The control functions performed at the 
cognitive level are essential for effective self-control by 
the whole agent; they constitute the mental substrate of 
this control. The lowest floor of the analysis refers to self-
control in the brain, that is, the neural substrate of the 
executive functions of the mind. Cognitive processes are 
carried out by the brain, thus there one should look for 
correlates or mechanisms of self-control, both in the case 
when it is effective, and when it is dysfunctional.
Understanding the essence of self-control requires 
research at all three levels of analysis, because they 
complement one another. The first step of such research 
should, however, consist of developing valid and reliable 
tools for examining personal (behavioural) self-control, 
especially in its relatively permanent form, i.e., regarded 
as an individual trait. When we know how to measure the 
individual level of self-control as a personal trait, we can 
ask how it is exerted at the two other levels, cognitive and 
neuronal. Therefore, there is a need to develop tools for 
measuring self-control. This paper presents the results of 
research on such a tool, which has been called the AS-36 
questionnaire.
A theoretical model of self-control
The questionnaire was designed on the basis of 
a theoretical model of self-control, which draws on two 
assumptions. First, we can distinguish two types of self-
control: reactive and proactive. Reactive self-control is 
one’s ability to adjust one’s own behaviour to external 
requirements, especially to prohibitions. The best example 
of this type of self-control is inhibition of undesirable 
responses, which manifests itself in resisting temptations 
or refraining from making unpleasant remarks to people. 
In this case, we speak colloquially about self-restraint, 
prudence or temperance. In contrast, proactive self-control 
is one’s ability to set oneself goals and achieve them in 
spite of obstacles and restrictions. In this case, we speak 
colloquially about perseverance, consistency in action, and 
far-sightedness.
Second, self-control requires reconciling many 
diverse behavioural tendencies, which correspond to the 
goals pursued by the person, and these goals, in turn, 
correspond to the person’s needs. Striving to satisfy our 
needs, and simultaneously complying with prohibitions, 
orders and expectations in the environment, we must 
constantly organize our activities in the temporal dimension 
(i.e., in time), and also in the hierarchic dimension. The 
temporal order is related to the urgency of our needs and 
their corresponding goals, whereas the hierarchic order is 
related to their importance. Reconciling one system with 
the other can be difficult, as in the case when someone 
pursues primarily urgent goals, ignoring their important 
goals, or vice versa. Effective self-control requires careful 
creation and application of a “timetable” for activities 
(contention scheduling, Norman and Shallice, 1986), 
because neither the temporal nor the hierarchic order forms 
itself spontaneously. The elementary manifestation of 
human ability to create and apply an order within one’s own 
actions is task switching (e.g., Arrington & Logan, 2005). 
Dysfunctions of task switching cause perseveration, i.e., 
persistent carrying out of activities which previously were 
proper, but are currently inadequate because of a significant 
change of circumstances. A manifestation of rigidity, 
complementary to perseveration, is learned irrelevance 
(see, e.g., Słabosz et al., 2006), consisting in the inability 
to reuse a rule which previously turned out to be useless, 
but now again requires applying. Perseveration and learned 
inadequacy can be observed in intensified form in patients 
with disorders of control functions (e.g., Sandson & Albert, 
1984), although in lesser intensity they can also be seen in 
healthy and able individuals.
The proposed theoretical model suggests that in the 
measurement of self-control it is necessary to capture 
at least three different abilities. The first comes down 
to setting and pursuing long-term goals, along with 
corresponding actions. This would be a manifestation 
of proactive self-control, oriented to future results, 
and requiring independent planning and sticking to 
previously set goals. The second is the ability to switch 
from one action to another, chosen from a number of 
available options. The creation of a logical “timetable” 
of many parallel actions of various importance and time 
requirements is an extremely complex cognitive function, 
and any dysfunctions in this area result in a low level of 
flexibility and persistent sticking to patterns of behaviour 
which are inadequate in current situation. The third ability 
consists of resisting the influence of external and internal 
distractors. In order to be able to efficiently work towards 
long-term goals, one has to be able to resist temptations 
and impulses to pursue alternative or even competitive 
goals. This ability may be called inhibition and it may 
apply both to one’s own behaviour (inhibiting a dominant 
response) and to external events (ignoring distractions). 
These three fundamental control abilities were taken 
into account during the construction of the AS-36 
questionnaire.
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Measurement of self-control
At this point, we need to ask a question about the 
sense of creating a self-report tool for examining self-
control, when psychologists have at their disposal many 
experimental tasks, such as those used by Miyake and his 
team (Miyake et al., 2000), as well as by other researchers 
(e.g., Chuderski, Taraday, Nęcka & Smoleń, 2012). It seems 
that we can identify four reasons justifying the decision to 
create a new tool.
First, computerized experimental tasks have never 
been intended for use in psychometric research on 
individual differences, that is, they were not designed as 
tests. Their use as tests presents methodological problems, 
mainly associated with low external validity of these tools. 
A typical cognitive task should have primarily theoretical 
validity, which is needed for the study of basic cognitive 
processes. For example, the flanker task (Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974) was designed to examine the process of 
coping with attention distractors, depending on the number 
of distractors, their nature, and spatial distance from the 
target stimulus. The flanker task is very well suited for 
this purpose because of its high theoretical validity, that 
is, its concordance with the construct. However, its use as 
a diagnostic or psychometric tool raises questions about its 
external validity, that is, if on its basis we can predict global 
features of behaviour.
Second, examining individual differences in the area 
of executive functions makes sense only to the extent 
that it allows us to better understand personal self-control 
(i.e., manifested at the level of individual behaviour). If 
we could predict the level of personal self-control on 
the basis of performance of tasks engaging executive 
functions, the self-control could be tested exclusively at 
the cognitive level, using an appropriately selected battery 
of tasks. But the problem is that the relationship between 
personal self-control and cognitive self-control may 
be insignificant (see Nęcka et al., 2012). One important 
meta-analytical study (Duckworth & Kern, 2011) showed 
that the intercorrelations among various measures of self-
control were rather weak, particularly if executive functions 
tasks are concerned. So, it seems questionable whether 
computerized cognitive tasks measuring the level of 
development of the so-called executive functions, e.g., the 
Stroop task (1935), the flankers task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 
1974), or the antisaccade task (O’Driscoll et al., 1995; 
Orylska & Racicka, 2014), give us an insight into the level 
of development of personal self-control, visible at the level 
of individual behaviour.
Third, computerized cognitive tasks are time 
consuming and technically demanding. Conducting tests 
with the use of a reasonable battery of such tools must 
last at least an hour, or even longer in the case of elderly 
people. In the latter case, there is also the problem of lower 
capability to use computer equipment. What is needed is 
a tool, which would be easy and quick to use, suitable for 
screening of large samples.
Fourth, computerized cognitive tasks examine self-
control at the cognitive level, whereas the self-control 
processes occur also at two other levels of analysis: those of 
the brain and behaviour. At the moment, the neuronal level 
is not really interesting to us, but the behavioural dimension 
of cognitive self-control is something that should be well 
measured, but not always is.
A behavioural indicator of self-control is, for example, 
the marshmallow test (Mischel, 1974; Mischel, Shoda, 
& Rodriguez, 1989). Children at the age of around four 
years were given candy (a marshmallow) as a reward, with 
the explanation that if they wait for the return of an adult 
before they consume it, they will get a second marshmallow. 
Here, an indicator of self-control is the duration of reward 
delay – the longer the delay, the better the self-control. An 
analogous indicator of self-control in adults is the declared 
ability to postpone reward, e.g., financial gratification 
(Ostaszewski, Bąbel & Swebodziński, 2013; Rachlin, 
2000). In studies of this type, the participants are to decide, 
for example, if they prefer a smaller sum right away, or 
a greater sum after some time, and the experimenters 
vary the size of the sums and the duration of delay. 
Quasi-experimental measures of behavioural self-control, 
especially the marshmallow test, have gained popularity 
and recognition, sometimes showing amazing capabilities 
to predict various aspects of success in life (Berman et al., 
2013; Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 1988; Moffitt et al., 
2011). However, one can have doubts about the reliability 
of measuring self-control as a trait on the basis of a single 
exposure to temptation. Besides, such “tests” are limited to 
one aspect of self-control, which is undoubtedly important, 
but does not determine everything, namely, the ability to 
postpone gratification. Constructing a new tool, we were 
guided by the need to have a short and easy to use screening 
method, able to capture various aspects of the studied 
phenomenon. On this basis of this method, people could 
be qualified to tests with the use of more specialized tools.
The construction of the scale
The construction of the scale proceeded in several 
stages. At the beginning, a team of people created starting 
material in the form of more than 250 items. Their content 
referred to various aspects of self-control, such as:
– refraining from inadequate behaviour, 
– suppressing “undesirable” thoughts, 
– switching between tasks and actions, 
– coping with at least two tasks performed simultane-
ously,
– remembering one’s own obligations, dates, and dead-
lines,
– remembering one’s own plans and intentions.
In the second stage, the starting material was analysed 
in terms of its content and language form. Identical or very 
similar items were removed, grammar forms were revised, 
linguistic errors were corrected, and items that were too 
long or too complicated (e.g., with double negatives) were 
eliminated. This work was done by one person. As a result, 
we obtained 200 items suitable for further research.
In the third stage, an initial questionnaire with 200 
items was created on the basis of previously selected and 
corrected items. The tool was called the “Self-knowledge 
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Sheet” (Arkusz samowiedzy, AS) in order to mask the true 
purpose of the study. The questionnaire was provided with 
the following instruction: “Please indicate how much you 
agree or disagree with each statement below. Mark your 
answer in the box on the left side of each statement. If you 
cannot decide, enter 0”. Below this instruction, there was 
a scale ranging from -3 (Strongly disagree), through -2 
(Disagree), -1 (Somewhat disagree), 0 (Don’t know), +1 
(Somewhat agree), +2 (Agree), up to +3 (Strongly agree). 
Below the scale, there were 200 questionnaire items, each 
in a separate horizontal frame. On the left side of each item, 
there was a small box for the answer.
In the fourth stage, the initial questionnaire was used 
in empirical research which aimed to select the best items, 
establish their final list, and also establish the factor structure 
of the questionnaire. For this purpose, we examined several 
samples of participants, with a total number of 1,054 
participants. These were students representing various 
fields of study, except for psychology; employees of 
several international companies operating in Poland; elderly 
residents of a care centre, without any diagnosed mental 
disorders; and people recruited through social media. The 
age of the participants ranged between 18 and 75, with a 
near normal distribution (M=40.03, SD=13.71; 44% female, 
56% male). The participants completed the questionnaire in 
groups (students, employees of companies), or individually 
(care centre residents, people recruited through social 
media). The elderly people had the questionnaire items read 
to them, if they asked for it. The duration of completing the 
questionnaire ranged from 30 to 60 minutes.
In the next stage of the research, we conducted an 
exploratory factor analysis, aiming at reducing the number 
of items and identifying several factors. At this point, we 
did not specify the number of factors, and we did not apply 
rotation. We used the method of principal components. 
As a result of these analyses, we isolated 45 items with 
eigenvalues exceeding 1.00. The scree graph suggested 
separation of three factors. Accordingly, we did the factor 
analysis again, but this time with the imposed number 
of three factors and Varimax orthogonal rotation (with 
Kaiser normalization) in order to maximize the variation in 
factors and to minimize common variation of two or three 
factors. As a criterion for assigning items to the factors, we 
assumed factor loading with a value greater than +0.40, 
or less than -0.40. Moreover, we excluded items which 
were highly loading more than one factor. As a result, we 
obtained three factors with 15 items in each of them.
The content analysis of items loading individual 
factors led to the following theoretical interpretation:
1. H-factor (Hamowanie, i.e., Inhibition)
The H-factor represents our ability to refrain from 
actions which could have inadequate or even harmful 
consequences. It refers to verbal and non-verbal responses 
associated with social life or with achieving personal goals. 
It also refers to the ability to control one’s own emotions. 
Moreover, the H-factor represents the ability to postpone 
gratification and satisfaction, that is, the ability to resist 
impulses and temptations.
Typical questionnaire items highly loading this factor 
include:
“I usually don’t buy anything on impulse”, or
“When I’m excited, I say things that I later regret” (inverted 
scale).
2. P-factor (Przełączanie, i.e., Switching).
The P-factor represents the ability to change the course 
of action or to switch from one activity to another. Such 
a change can be forced by external circumstances (an 
exogenous change), or can be volitional (an endogenous 
change). People who are not able to switch from one task 
to another present themselves as cognitively rigid, and not 
flexible in their behaviour. A low level of this dimension 
can also manifest itself in perseveration, that is, in constant 
repetition of actions which are long out of date or not 
properly adjusted to the context.
Typical questionnaire items related to this factor 
include:
“I can use someone else’s vehicle or equipment (e.g., 
telephone) without any problems” or
“When something interrupts my work, I need several 
minutes to focus on my job again” (inverted scale).
3. M-factor (Monitorowanie, i.e., Goal Monitoring, Goal 
Maintenance).
This factor refers to the so-called prospective control, 
which is future-oriented. Goal Monitoring consists of 
remembering one’s own intentions and objectives, meeting 
deadlines and obligations, and also in realistic planning 
and controlling the implementation of plans. People who 
receive low scores on this subscale are characterized by 
a poor ability to cope with obligations and deadlines. They 
also have problems with prospective memory about their 
own intentions and objectives.
Examples of the questionnaire items highly loading 
this factor include:
“I always meet a fixed deadline” or
“Sometimes I don’t know what I wanted to do or say 
a moment earlier” (inverted scale).
This version of the scale was used in several empirical 
studies. In an unpublished study involving a sample of 
191 people (including 83 women) aged from 20 to 80 
(median=46), the three factors obtained satisfactory 
reliability measured by Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. 
The alpha values were as follows: 0.87 (H-factor), 0.81 
(P-factor), and 0.84 (M-factor). The reliability of the 
whole questionnaire obtained an alpha value = 0.89. The 
indicators were satisfactory, therefore this version of the 
questionnaire was used in the study aimed at determining 
whether self-reports correspond to objective measures 
of cognitive control (Nęcka et al., 2012). The answer 
to this question proved to be negative. Participants in 
that study completed the questionnaire and performed 
three computerized tasks engaging cognitive control. No 
significant correlations between objective measures and 
self-description were found. This result can be interpreted 
as a lack of proof of the questionnaire’s validity, or – 
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alternatively – as evidence that cognitive tasks are not 
useful as psychometric tests.
The results of the unpublished study involving 
191 participants also suggested that all three scales of 
the questionnaire could be reduced to 12 items without 
significant decrease in reliability. Accordingly, the number 
of items in the questionnaire was reduced, and we obtained 
the final version of the tool, consisting of 36 items, 12 on 
each of three dimensions. This version of the scale was 
named AS-36 (Arkusz samowiedzy, Self-knowledge Sheet, 
36 items). In this form, the scale was used in the validation 
and standardization studies described1.
Standardization and validation studies
Participants
The final 36-items Self-Control Scale, called AS-36 
(Arkusz samowiedzy, Self-knowledge Sheet, 36 items), was 
used in the studies aiming to determine its reliability and 
validity, as well as the norms allowing interpretation of 
single results. In these studies, a total of N=935 participants 
voluntarily took part; their age ranged between 18 and 
66 (M=27.68; SD=7.85); and they included 606 women 
and 329 men. Only 392 participants disclosed their level 
of education; in this group one person had elementary 
education, 172 participants (44%) had secondary education, 
and 219 participants (56%) had higher education. All the 
participants belonged to one of the following samples:
1 People recruited through social media and websites 
for job seekers (N=34). These people were receiving 
net payment of 50 PLN for 2–2.5 hours of work which 
consisted in completing psychological questionnaires 
and performing a cognitive task in the fMRI scanner. 
The AS-36 scale was being completed at the very 
beginning of the procedure.
2. A sample analogous to the preceding one, separately 
recruited (N=32).
3. A sample analogous to the preceding two samples, 
separately recruited (N=29).
4. People recruited through advertisements and social 
media (N=102). These people were receiving net 
payment of 100 PLN for participation in two sessions. 
They were completing tests and questionnaires, and 
participated in research with the use of magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI). The AS-36 scale was being 
completed at the first session, before the resonance 
study.
5. Employees from several branches of an international 
bank operating in Poland (N=90), recruited during an 
off-site training. The participants did not receive any 
financial compensation.
6. Students participating in the study on functioning 
in close relationships (N=243), recruited through 
the Institute of Psychology system of recruiting 
participants; they did not receive any financial 
compensation.
7. People recruited through social media networking 
and an Internet portal for job seekers (N=145). These 
participants received net payments of 20 or 30 PLN 
for completing a battery of questionnaires and tests, 
which included the AS-36 scale.
8. People (N=260) recruited through the portal 
SurveyMonkey, which allows for remote data 
collection via the Internet. These participants did not 
receive any payment, and they completed only the 
AS-36 scale.
Reliability analysis
Reliability analysis was performed on all the data 
collected from 935 participants. Additionally, we examined 
whether particular samples differed in reliability. We 
used Cronbach’s alpha index and split-half reliability 
indices (See Table 1). Cronbach’s index in relation to the 
overall score had the value a=0.797, whereas in relation to 
particular subscales it had the following values: H Scale, 
a=0.623; P scale, a=0.742; M Scale, a=0.777. Therefore, 
we can say that the examined tool shows a good level of 
internal consistency in the case of the overall score and 
the dimensions of switching and goal monitoring. The 
inhibition dimension obtained less satisfactory, but still 
acceptable estimate of internal consistency. Also, the split-
half reliability analysis revealed a generally high level of 
internal consistency of the examined tool. Moreover, the 
analysis of particular questionnaire items did not reveal 
even a single item which would significantly decrease the 
reliability of both the overall score and the three particular 
dimensions.
Table 1. Reliability analysis of the AS-36 scale 
and its three subscales (N = 935)
Ca S-B G
AS-36 0.797 0.803 0.803
Subscale H 0.623 0.657 0.656
Subscale P 0.742 0.771 0.770
Subscale M 0.777 0.713 0.713
Explanations:
Ca the Cronbach alpha coefficient
S-B  the Spearman-Brown split-half reliability coefficient
G the Guttman split-half reliability coefficient
H Inhibition
P Switching
M Goal monitoring
Since Cronbach’s alpha is heavily dependent on the 
length of scales, we decided to supplement the reliability 
indices with mean interitem correlations, which are good 
estimations of content saturation of scales (John & Benet-
Martinez, 2000). The mean interitem correlations were as 
follows: .31, .41, and .48, respectively for the H, P, and M 
subscales.
1 The scale can be obtained from the author for academic purposes.
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Validity analysis
The convergent validity of the scale AS-36 was 
assessed through the correlation analysis of the results 
obtained with its use with the score in the self-control 
scale developed in the laboratory of Roy Baumeister 
(Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Moreover, for 
comparison purposes, we used the conscientiousness 
scale from the NEO-FFI questionnaire, because the nature 
of this personality trait is close to self-control as a trait. 
The tests on a sample of 145 participants (the sample no. 
7) showed a strong covariance of the overall score in the 
scale AS-36 with the results in Baumeister’s scale (r=0.71, 
p<0.001), and almost as strong a correlation with the 
conscientiousness scale (r=0.63, p<0.001). Therefore, it 
can be concluded that the scale AS-36 allows measurement 
of self-control in a manner similar to other tools used for 
this purpose. At the same time, some interesting differences 
between the subscales emerged (see Table 2).
The divergent validity was assessed through the 
correlation analysis of the results in the scale AS-36 with 
the scores in intelligence tests and in the scales of other 
– beside conscientiousness – personality traits. The tests 
on a sample of 102 participants (the sample no. 4) showed 
a lack of significant correlations of the overall score in the 
scale AS-36 with the results in the advanced version of 
Raven’s test (r=0.08, p=0.59), and also with the results in 
Chuderski’s Figural Analogies Test (r=-0.06, p=0.58). In 
the same sample, we also observed a significant negative 
correlation (r=-46, p=0.002) between the overall score 
in the scale AS-36 with the trait anxiety measured by the 
STAI questionnaire (Spielberger et al., 1983). Moreover, 
in the sample no. 7, we found no significant correlation 
between the overall score in the scale AS-36 with the 
results in the advanced version of Raven’s test (r=0.04, 
p=0.64) and Choynowski’s (1967) Words Knowledge 
Test (r=0.11, p=0.18). In the same sample, we also found 
a negative correlation with neuroticism (r=-0.47, p<0.001). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the scale AS-36 does not 
show any correlations with the fluid intelligence, nor with 
the crystallized intelligence, whereas it shows a reverse 
covariance with personality dimensions associated with 
anxiety and emotional instability (see Table 2).
Descriptive statistics and correlation analyses
Table 3 shows basic descriptive statistics in relation 
to the overall score and to particular subscales. We see 
a sufficiently large variation of results, demonstrated by 
a large difference between the minimum and maximum 
scores and by the value of standard deviation in relation 
to the mean, minimum and maximum. These observations 
rule out a ceiling effect, or a floor effect, and justify the use 
of the scale AS-36 as a tool for measuring inter-individual 
differences. Some concern may be caused by a left-sided 
asymmetry in the distribution, manifested by the negative 
index of skewness, especially in the scales of Switching 
and Goal Monitoring. The Inhibition scale, and especially 
the overall score, showed a much better fit to the normal 
distribution. Left-skewness of the distribution of the P and 
Table 2. Results of the validity analysis of the scale AS-36
AS-36 H AS-36 P AS-36 M AS-36
Convergent validity (N = 145)
S-S  .65***  .18*  .68**  .71***
C  .38**  .22*  .70**  .63***
Divergent validity (N = 102)
RAPM -.07  .28* -.01  .08
TAO  .08 -.08 -.10 -.06
TZS  .16  .03  .02  .09
N -.34** -.34** -.33** -.48**
STAI -.38* -.26 -.36* -.46**
Explanations:
S-S Self-Control Scale (Tangney, Baumeister & Boone, 2004)
C Conscientiousness (NEO-FFI)
RAPM Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices
TAO Figural Analogies Test (Test Analogii Obrazkowych)
TZS Words Knowledge Test (Test Znajomości Słów) (Choynowski, 1967)
N Neuroticism
STAI Trait anxiety
H Inhibition
P Switching
M Goal monitoring
* p < 0.05 (two-tailed), ** p < 0.01 (two-tailed), *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed)
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M scales indicates that there is a slight overrepresentation 
of scores above the mean, which may result from the 
fact that the participants overestimate themselves, or 
from the fact that in the case of these two subscales the 
questionnaire items referred to relatively simple, everyday 
situations, in which majority of healthy people are doing 
well or very well. Another problem is a slight deviation 
from the normal distribution in the form of kurtosis: the 
results in all the subscales, and particularly in the overall 
scale, show a leptokurtic distribution, that is, the tendency 
of participants to aggregate around the average values, 
rather than at the extremes. It should be expected that the 
application of the scale AS-36 in a study involving people 
who are less efficient or belong to vulnerable groups (e.g., 
drug addicts) would weaken the leptokurtic character of the 
distribution.
Table 4 shows the results of correlation analyses. 
We see that the scales of Inhibition and Switching are not 
mutually correlated, whereas the scale of Goal Monitoring 
is significantly, although not strongly, correlated with the 
other two. The overall score is correlated with all three 
subscales, which is obvious, considering that it is their sum. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the Goal Monitoring 
scale is most strongly correlated with the overall score, 
whereas the Switching scale is least correlated. Correlation 
analyses suggest that in some cases – besides the overall 
score – it is worth analysing the results in particular 
subscales, because they can give us important information 
about diverse development of particular dimensions of 
personal self-control.
Third-person version
Assuming that people may not have sufficient insight 
into their own traits (Vazire, 2010), and therefore they 
may have difficulties in giving reliable answers about 
themselves, we made an attempt to construct a third-
person version of the self-control scale. It was created as 
a mutation of the first-person version, through replacing 
grammatical forms of the questionnaire items (cf. Ball 
et al., 1997). The purpose of this operation was to develop 
a tool which could complement self-reports by peer-reports, 
or reports made by other persons. Of course, this requires 
involvement of people who know the proper participant 
well. This can be a colleague, a family member, a friend 
or a close friend, or just a spouse (or a partner). Whereas 
in the case of self-reports, there is a problem whether the 
self-knowledge of a participant is sufficiently wide and 
adequate, in the case of a third-person description there 
is an additional question concerning a possible bias in 
Table 4. Correlation matrix of the scale AS-36 (N = 935)
AS-36 H AS-36 P AS-36 M AS-36 Total Age
AS-36 H – .08 .43** .67**  .23**
AS-36 P – – .27** .62** -.14*
AS-36 M – – – .81**  .19**
AS-36 Total – – – –  .13*
Explanations:
H Inhibition
P Switching
M Goal monitoring
* p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
** p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the scale AS-36 (N = 935)
Min Max Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis
AS-36 H -27 31  4.07  8.42 -0.17 0.21
AS-36 P -24 36 13.96  9.21 -0.38 0.17
AS-36 M -31 33  9.31 10.41 -0.49 0.25
AS-36 Total -60 94 27.34 19.95 -0.17 0.66
Explanations:
H Inhibition
P Switching
M Goal monitoring
Min Minimum
Max Maximum
SD Standard deviation
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responses. It seems that, despite these concerns, the scale in 
the third-person version, called AS-36-3, can be a valuable 
complement of data obtained from self-reports (see Vazire, 
2006). It can also be used in the studies on consistency of 
the two scores.
Data were obtained from a total number of 726 
people who had earlier been taken into account in the 
validation studies of the first-person version. Whenever 
there were two sources of external information about the 
participants, we also performed analyses concerning the 
level of correlation between two independent third-person 
descriptions.
Reliability analysis
The reliability of the full scale AS-36-3, assessed by 
Cronbach’s alpha index is a=0.778. No item significantly 
increased the a index after its exclusion, which means that 
no item significantly decreased the reliability of the scale. 
In particular subscales, the reliability was as follows: 
H scale (Inhibition), a=0.647; P scale (Switching), 
a=0.741; M scale (Goal Monitoring), a=0.790. Also, in the 
case of the subscales, we did not find any questionnaire 
item significantly decreasing their reliability. As to 
the content saturation measures, the mean interitem 
correlations were .33, .41, and .49, respectively for the H, 
P, and M subscales.
Descriptive statistics and correlation analyses
Table 5 shows basic descriptive statistics of the scale 
AS-36-3. We can see similar tendencies as in the first-
person version, perhaps with a little weaker indicators 
of the results range. Nevertheless, there are undoubtedly 
reasons to consider the scale AS-36-3 as a tool sufficiently 
good to examine individual differences. Again, we see 
a left-skewness of the distribution in the case of P and 
M scales, but the leptokurtic character of distributions 
disappeared. This may mean that in the third-person 
assessment the trait of self-control is distributed in 
a manner more resembling the normal distribution, whereas 
in self-reports participants avoid giving extreme answers. 
The important thing is that that the distribution of results 
in the overall scale does not differ significantly from the 
normal distribution (K-S=0.20, insignificant).
Table 6 shows correlations between the three 
subscales and the overall score in the scale AS-36-3. These 
correlations do not differ significantly from those found 
in the first-person version. The Switching scale reveals 
rather weak correlations with the other scales, and the Goal 
Monitoring scale – relatively the strongest correlations. The 
latter is also most strongly correlated with the overall score.
In the case of 530 people, we obtained self-reports 
(AS-36) and the data from a friend (AS-36-3). The third-
person version was completed by someone who had 
Table 6. Correlation matrix of the scale AS-36-3 (N = 726)
AS-36-3 H AS-36-3 P AS-36-3 M AS-36-3 Total
AS-36-3 H – .03 .37** .67**
AS-36-3 P – – .11* .56**
AS-36-3 M – – – .77**
Explanations:
H Inhibition
P Switching
M Goal monitoring
* p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
** p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of the scale AS-36-3 (N = 726)
Min Max Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis
AS-36-3 H -22 29  2.28  8.88 -0.11 -0.18
AS-36-3 P -16 36 11.50  9.47 -0.30 -0.20
AS-36-3 M -30 35  9.03 10.75 -0.47  0.09
AS-36-3 Total -52 76 22.81 19.81 -0.26  0.02
Explanations:
H Inhibition
P Switching
M Goal monitoring
Min Minimum
Max Maximum
SD Standard deviation
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known the participant for at least six months, had lived 
with the participant, or had collaborated with him or 
her every day. In the case 197 people, we collected self-
reports and the data obtained independently from two 
friends of the participant. Therefore, it was possible to 
examine the correlations between a self-report and two 
independent descriptions in the third-person version. In the 
last column in Table 7, we see the relationships between 
independent assessments of two friends, completing the 
AS-36-3 questionnaire on the participant. Concordance of 
the assessments can be considered, at most, moderate, as 
the correlation coefficients are in the range from r=+0.35 
to r=+0.51. The assessments are most strongly correlated 
for the Goal Monitoring scale, and least strongly – for 
the Switching scale. Overall scores obtained from two 
friends correlate with each other at the level of r=+0.38. 
This result is weaker than that which was obtained in the 
studies on neuroticism (r=0.63, Ball et al., 1997), but in 
those studies the third-person results were obtained from 
people who had known the proper participants for over 
11 years. In the remaining fields of Table 7, we see the 
correlation coefficients between self-reports (AS-36) and 
the third-person description (AS-36-3), separately for 
the first (1), and the second (2) friend. These coefficients 
should be regarded as low, except for the Goal Monitoring 
scale, where they have average values. For comparison, 
Ball and his colleagues (Ball et al., 1997) report correlation 
coefficients between self-reports and third-person 
descriptions at the level of r=0.55. Thus, we can say that 
self-reported self-control has a weak correlation with self-
control assessed by other people, which suggests that both 
versions should be used for thorough examination. The 
results of both versions can be interpreted separately, or 
can be compiled in some way, using an averaged index or 
creating a latent variable obtained on the basis of all the 
data. Not very high indices of concordance between third-
person description are a cause of concern, but they do not 
necessarily reflect badly on the tool itself – perhaps they 
just indicate that we do not have a good knowledge of other 
people, when it comes to assessment of their important 
individual traits. 
Summary
Scale AS-36, presented in this paper, seems to be 
a sufficiently good tool to evaluate individual level of 
self-control understood as a trait. The obtained reliability 
indices are satisfactory, especially in the case of the overall 
score. The analysis of individual subscales should be 
performed with due caution, as the reliability of one of 
the subscales – the Inhibition – oscillates between 0.60 
and 0.70, which is not a good result, although acceptable. 
Scale AS-36 also shows good indicators of divergent and 
convergent validity. As to stability, relevant investigations 
of the test-retest correlations are still to be done.
An important component of the proposed tool is 
a third-person mutation called AS-36-3, which was 
constructed by changing grammatical forms of the 
questionnaire items from the first person singular to the 
third person. This version is intended to allow evaluation 
of the level of self-control by informants who know the 
proper participant. In scientific research, this is intended 
to make evaluations more objective by getting out from 
the circle of self-report methods, which prevail in the 
study of personality. Whereas in applied studies and 
psychological practice, the AS-36-3 version is intended 
Table 7. Correlations between the first-person version (AS-36) and the third-person version (AS-36-3) (N = 197)
AS-36 H AS-36 P AS-36 M AS-36 AS-36-3 (2)
AS-36-3 H (1) .16* .39**
AS-36-3 P (1) .30** .35**
AS-36-3 M (1) .37** .51**
AS-36-3 (1) .20** .38**
AS-36-3 H (2) .19*
AS-36-3 P (2) .24**
AS-36-3 M (2) .46**
AS-36-3 (2) .28*
Explanations:
AS-36 the first-person version
AS-36-3 (1) the third-person version, first friend
AS-36-3 (2) the third-person version, second friend
H Inhibition
P Switching
M Goal monitoring
* p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
** p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
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to facilitate gaining information about the level of self-
control in people who have limited self-knowledge, or who 
do not have sufficiently strong motivation to disclose their 
traits. This can be important in clinical examinations in 
the case of people who manifest general or specific (e.g., 
related to addictions) deficits in self-control. However, 
such applications of the AS-36 scale and its third person 
mutation require further research on the external validity 
of the tool.
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